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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of credit-supply factors in business cycle fluctuations. For 
this purpose, we introduce an imperfectly competitive banking sector into a DSGE model 
with financial frictions. Banks issue collateralized loans to both households and firms, obtain 
funding via deposits and accumulate capital from retained earnings. Margins charged on 
loans depend on bank capital-to-assets ratios and on the degree of interest rate stickiness. 
Bank balance-sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects 
bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and cost of loans. The model is estimated with 
Bayesian techniques using data for the euro area. The analysis delivers the following results. 
First, the existence of a banking sector partially attenuates the effects of demand shocks, 
while it helps propagate supply shocks. Second, shocks originating in the banking sector 
explain the largest share of the fall of output in 2008 in the euro area, while macroeconomic 
shocks played a limited role. Third, an unexpected destruction of bank capital has a 
substantial impact on the real economy and particularly on investment.  
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    1 Introduction1
This paper seeks to understand the role of ¯nancial frictions and banking intermediation in
shaping business-cycle dynamics. To this end, we formulate and estimate a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model incorporating a banking sector that enjoys some degree of market
power (on both sides of the balance sheet) and that accumulates bank capital subject to
a capital adequacy requirement. We use our model to investigate, ¯rst, how the transmis-
sion mechanisms of monetary and technology impulses are modi¯ed by the introduction
of banking and, second, how shocks that originate in credit markets are transmitted to
the real economy. Moreover, we estimate the contribution of shocks originating within
the banking sector to the slowdown in euro area economic activity during 2008.
Our main motivation comes from the recent ¯nancial crisis. Policy-makers have tra-
ditionally highlighted the importance of ¯nancial factors in shaping the business cycle:
the possible interactions between credit markets and the real economy are a customary
part of the overall assessment on monetary policy stance. Since the onset of the ¯nancial
turmoil in August 2007, the potential strength of these interlinkages has become partic-
ularly evident. Banks came under the spotlight as losses from subprime credit exposure
and from signi¯cant write-o®s on asset-backed securities raised concerns that a wave of
widespread credit restrictions might trigger a severe economic downturn.
Despite its importance for policy-making, most quantitative macromodels employed in
academia and policy institutions until recently contained only a very primitive treatment
of the interaction between ¯nancial and credit markets, on the one hand, and the rest of the
economy, on the other. Seminal contributions from Bernanke et al. (1999) and Iacoviello
(2005) have started to ¯ll this gap by introducing credit and collateral requirements in
quantitative general equilibrium models. Since in these models credit transactions take
place only through the market, more recent models have begun to study the role of
¯nancial intermediaries (Christiano et al., 2008; Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). Most
of these models, however, emphasize the demand side of credit. The credit spread that
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily re°ect
those of the Bank of Italy. We bene¯ted of comments from Tobias Adrian, Oscar Arce, Jarom¶ ³r Benes,
Vasco C¶ urdia, Harris Dellas, Gr¶ egory de Walque, Joris de Wind, Eugenio Gaiotti, Jordi Gal¶ ³, Leonardo
Gambacorta, Matteo Iacoviello, John Leahy, Jesper Lind¶ e, Fernando L¶ opez Villaverde, Caterina Mendi-
cino, Fabio Panetta, Anti Ripatti, Argia Sbordone, Skander van den Heuvel, Mike Woodford and Tack
Yun. We also thank participants at the Bank of Italy June '08 \DSGE in the Policy Environment"
conference, the Macro Modeling workshop '08, the WGEM and CCBS July '08 workshop at the Bank
of England, the ECB Dec. '08 \Financial Markets and Macroeconomic Stability" conference, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board June '09 \Financial Markets and Monetary Policy" conference, the DNB Oct. '09
\Housing and Credit Dynamics: Causes and Consequences" conference, the SNB Sept. '09 \Financial
Markets, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy" conference, the Riksbank Nov. '09 \Financial Markets and the
Macroeconomy: Challenges for Central Banks" workshop, the SED and EEA '09 meetings, and at sem-
inars at NY Fed, DG EcFin and CREI-Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Contacts: andrea.gerali@bancaditalia.it;
stefano.neri@bancaditalia.it; luca.sessa@bancaditalia.it; federicomaria.signoretti@bancaditalia.it.
5arises in equilibrium (called the external ¯nance premium) is a function of the riskiness of
the entrepreneurs' investment projects and/or their net wealth. Banks, operating under
perfect competition, simply accommodate the changing conditions from the demand side.
We, instead, believe that conditions from the supply side of credit markets { such
as the degree of competition prevailing in the banking sector, rate-setting strategies or
banks' ¯nancial soundness { are at least as important in shaping business cycle dynamics,
especially in the euro area where banks are the primary source of funds for households and
¯rms.2 This relation is apparent in the responses of the banks to the euro area quarterly
Bank Lending Survey. In Figure 1, separately for entrepreneurs' and households' loans,
we reproduce two charts showing the behavior of the synthetic indexes of loan supply
restriction (i.e. the net percentage of responding banks indicating a tightening in lending
standards in any given quarter), of lending margins (as reported by the responding banks)
and of the impact of competitive pressure and costs related to banks' capital position on
lending standards (again, as reported by banks). These ¯gures document how supply
factors like those related to the degree of competition among banks or to the costs of
banking capital positions are strongly correlated, over di®erent periods, with rates and
conditions for access to credit. Our model is designed to capture supply side aspects
of this kind. Starting from a standard model, featuring credit frictions and borrowing
constraints as in Iacoviello (2005) and a set of real and nominal frictions as in Christiano
et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003), we add a stylized banking sector characterized
by three distinctive features.
First, our banks set di®erent rates for households and ¯rms and, in so doing, they
enjoy some degree of market power. The recognition that a degree of monopolistic power
exists in both the loan and the deposit markets generates in the model markups (and
a markdown) with respect to the policy rate, which adjust along the cycle. Since the
seminal contributions of Monti (1972) and Klein (1971) the microliterature on banking
has recognized the importance of studying models of monopolistic competition in the
banking sector. Theoretical justi¯cations range from asymmetric information to long-
term customer relationships or the presence of switching costs and other nominal frictions.
In this paper, we do not try to investigate the source of the market power we attribute
to banks. Instead, we calibrate the rate elasticities of loan and deposit demands in the
model to reproduce the degree of market power empirically observed in the euro area.
Second, our monopolistic banks face costs of adjusting their retail rates, and the pass-
through of changing ¯nancing conditions is incomplete on impact. This is an important
ingredient if the model is to capture the di®erent speeds at which the variety of banks'
rates react to changing conditions in money markets. The empirical evidence in favor of
a partial and heterogenous adjustment of bank rates is overwhelming (see, for the euro
2 In 2008, bank deposits in the euro area accounted for around 95% of household short-term ¯nancial
assets, while bank loans equaled around 90% of total household liabilities; similarly for ¯rms, in 2008
bank lending accounted for almost 90% of corporate ¯nancial debt (i.e. loans plus debt securities) (ECB,
2009a).
6area, de Bondt, 2005 and Kok S¿rensen and Werner, 2006).
Third, banks accumulate capital (from retained earnings), as they try to keep their
capital-to-assets ratio as close as possible to an (exogenously given) target level. This
target level might derive from mandatory capital requirements for banking activity (like
those set forth explicitly in the Basel Accords) or, in a deeper structural model, might
be the equilibrium outcome from optimally balancing the higher costs of internal sources
of funding and the bene¯ts of having more \skin in the game" to mitigate typical agency
problems in credit markets. Through this leverage ratio and the bank balance sheet
identity, bank capital in°uences both the amounts issued and the rate setting of loans and
deposits. This introduces important feedback loops between the real and ¯nancial sides of
the economy. On the one hand, we can model some shocks that originate in credit markets
as \¯nancial" shocks; on the other hand, macro shocks are ampli¯ed and/or propagated
to a di®erent extent depending on the \soundness" of the ¯nancial sector, i.e. depending
on whether or not the banking sector is at the optimal leverage ratio when the macro
shock hits.
Other authors have studied dynamic general equilibrium models with a banking sector
or economies where several ¯nancial instruments co-exist. In independent works, C¶ urdia
and Woodford (2008), Andr¶ es and Arce (2009), Benes and Lees (2007), Aliaga-D¶ ³az and
Olivero (2007) and Aslam and Santoro (2008), have developed models with ¯nancial
intermediaries and a time-varying spread between deposits and lending rates. Markovic
(2006), de Walque et al. (2008), van den Heuvel (2008) and Meh and Moran (2008), have
instead studied the role of equity and bank capital for the transmission of macroeconomic
shocks. Neither of them includes (heterogeneous) rate stickiness, or the kind of capital
requirements that we consider. Therefore our model combines the main insights from
these strands of literature and adds to them. Moreover, by taking the model to the data
we provide a careful quantitative evaluation of our model results.
In fact, we estimate the model with Bayesian techniques and data for the euro area over
the period 1998:Q1-2009:Q1 and use the estimated model to analyze two sets of issues.
First, we want to understand how ¯nancial intermediation modi¯es the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy and technology shocks. Our model features an interme-
diation spread due to the interest-rate setting behavior of banks. Movements in this
spread alter the pass-through of changes in the policy rate to bank rates, which are the
relevant rates for consumption and investment decisions. This mechanism modi¯es the ef-
fectiveness of the transmission channels that are usually at work in standard models with
endogenous borrowing constraints and no active ¯nancial intermediation (see Section 5).
In particular, credit market power and the ensuing markup between lending rates and
the policy rate amplify changes in the policy rate for borrowers (i.e. impatient households
and entrepreneurs), while the markdown between the policy and the deposit rate implies
an attenuating e®ect for lenders (i.e. patient agents). Sticky interest rates, instead, un-
ambiguously induce an attenuation e®ect (with respect to a °exible-rate setup), as banks
7translate changes in the policy rate to borrowing and lending rates only partially. Finally,
the impact of bank capital depends on the correlation between bank leverage (i.e. the
inverse of the capital-to-assets ratio) and the policy rate: if bank leverage increases when
policy is tightened, then the transmission of shocks to the real economy is ampli¯ed; on
the contrary, a fall in leverage during periods of policy tightening smooths °uctuations in
the real economy. Given these facts, the overall impact of ¯nancial intermediation on the
transmission mechanism depends on the relative importance and the mutual interactions
of the heterogenous e®ects on the various agents. As regards monetary policy, overall
we ¯nd that the attenuating e®ect of banking prevails, muting the response of both con-
sumption and investment and mainly re°ecting the presence of sticky bank rates. Also,
after a technology shock ¯nancial intermediation induces some attenuation on output,
mainly due to the impact of monopolistic power on consumption; in this case, however,
banking also enhances the endogenous propagation mechanism of the model, inducing
higher persistence in the response of real variables.
Secondly, we analyze how ¯nancial shocks are transmitted to the real economy and
how they contribute to business cycle °uctuations. In the model, we assume that bank
rate margins, as well as credit supply, are subject to exogenous innovations. Thus, the
model is an appropriate environment to study how those shocks a®ect households' and
entrepreneurs' consumption and investment decisions. To this end, we perform two exer-
cises. In the ¯rst one, we use the model to quantify (ex-post) the contribution of shocks
originating in the banking sector to the slowdown experienced in the euro area in 2008.
The results suggest that almost all the contraction of real GDP was due to factors that
either pushed up the cost of credit or reduced the amount of credit available to the pri-
vate sector. In the second exercise, we simulate a \credit crunch" scenario, instrumented
through an exogenous and persistent destruction of bank capital. Banks' need to handle
the capital loss, by re-balancing assets and liabilities and minimizing costs from deviation
from a target leverage ratio, triggers an increase in lending margins and a contraction in
credit volumes. The ensuing negative e®ects on real activity are substantial: the restric-
tion on credit severely a®ects ¯rms' investment, while despite a temporary improvement in
labor income aggregate consumption is also hit, generating a considerable fall in aggregate
demand and output.
Our model admittedly omits some elements of the current ¯nancial crisis (e.g., the
increase in risk in ¯nancial markets and the freezing up of money markets). However, we
think that our analysis constitutes an important step in the direction of quantifying the
e®ects of credit sector shocks on the business cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some arguments and
empirical evidence justifying our key modeling choices. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of the model. Section 5 studies the dynamic
properties of the model, focusing on monetary policy and technology shocks. Section 6
quanti¯es the role of shocks originating in the banking sector in the recent downturn of
8economic activity in the euro area and studies the e®ects of a fall in bank capital on the
economy. Section 7 concludes.
2 Market power and sluggish rates in the banking
sector
In this section we discuss the key assumptions that we make about the banking sector,
namely the presence of monopolistic power in the deposit and loan markets, as well as
the stickiness of bank rates with respect to movements in the corresponding market rates,
reviewing both theoretical and empirical arguments in their support.
As regards monopolistic competition, there seems to be an undisputed consensus in the
microeconomic theory of ¯nancial intermediation about the existence of market power in
banking.3 One often cited reason is the presence of switching costs, for both customers and
lenders, which generate a \lock-in" e®ect that gives banks market power. The banking in-
dustry is typically characterized by long-term relationships between banks and borrowers,
as a result of asymmetric information problems which induce banks to devote resources to
monitor their customers.4 Given this market structure, switching banks is normally costly
for customers: changing ¯nancier entails the loss of the capitalized value of an established
relationship and the associated cost of signaling creditworthiness to the new lender (or
of having the value of collateral re-assessed). Similarly, potential competitors wishing
to attract customers from incumbent banks face the additional cost of screening the new
customers. Switching costs might also arise due to the presence of pure \menu costs", like
technical fees charged to close or to open a bank account, or fees incurred to apply for a
loan or to renegotiate the terms of an outstanding debt.5 Another frequently cited source
of bank rents is market structure. The traditional SCP (structure-conduct-performance)
approach links market concentration (as measured by the Her¯ndal-Hirschman Index or
by the n-bank concentration rate) to market power and interest rate-setting behavior
(Berger et al., 2004). Other studies highlight the importance of market contestability and
regulatory restrictions as a source of market power (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Levine,
2003). Regardless of the source, market power in loan and deposit markets allows banks
to set interest rates at a spread with respect to the relevant market rates, i.e. a markup
in the case of loans and a markdown for deposits.
Several empirical studies have con¯rmed the presence of market power in the banking
sector and studied its determinants over the business cycle. Berger et al. (2004) and
3 See the classical treatment in Freixas and Rochet (1997).
4 For some early seminal contributions see Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Diamond (1984); for
later models Greenbaum et al. (1989), and Sharpe (1990).
5 Von Thadden (2004) discusses switching costs due to information asymmetries between lenders. See
Miles (2004) for a detailed description of debt renegotiation costs for the UK or Kim et al. (2003) for an
estimate of the importance of switching costs in banking.
9Degryse and Ongena (2008) provide extensive surveys of the empirical literature on this
topic and, overall, conclude that the degree of competition - measured via di®erent in-
dicators - does indeed in°uence interest rate spreads and banks' pro¯tability. Among
the papers surveyed in these studies, Mandelman (2006), using data for 124 countries for
the years 1990-2000, documents how cyclical °uctuations in bank markups are related to
changes in the concentration and competitive pressure within the sector. Claessens and
Laeven (2004), using bank-level data, estimate the Panzar and Rosse's (1987) H-statistic6
for 50 countries for the period 1994-2001; they show that most banking markets can be
classi¯ed as monopolistically competitive, with a H-statistic ranging from 0.6 to 0.8. For
the euro area, De Bandt and Davis (2000) ¯nd that banks in the three largest economies
of the area (Germany, France and Italy) operate under monopolistic competition, with
the degree of market power being higher for small banks in all three countries in their
sample, perhaps since they cater more to local markets.
In our model, the measure of banks' market power is the (steady-state) interest rate
elasticities of deposit and loan demands: the lower the elasticities (in absolute value), the
higher the monopoly power. These elasticities equal 1,5 for the deposit rate and around
-3,0 for both loan rates.7 These numbers are pretty much in line with estimates from
empirical studies.8 For example, Dick (2002) estimates an interest-rate demand elasticity
for deposits at U.S. commercial banks over the period 1993-1999 of between 5.8 and 1.5;
Neven and RÄ oller (1999), using data for seven European countries for the period 1981-
1989, report a demand elasticity of -8.7 for mortgages and -6.8 for corporate loans. Other
possible indicators of market power are (steady-state) spreads between the loan and the
policy rate and between the policy rate and the deposit rate, which equal 1.7 and 1.2
percent (annual rates) in the model, and the loan-deposit rate margin (i.e. the sum of the
two spreads, equal to 2.9 percent). Similar numbers are found in empirical studies for
European countries. For example, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), analyzing ten European
countries between 1991 and 1999, compute an average spread with the money market
rate, for both deposit and loan rates, of 2.4 per cent; Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008)
calculate an average loan-deposit rate margin for 18 Western European countries between
1994 and 2001 { obtained as a ratio of the di®erence between interest income and interest
expenses with respect to total earning assets { of 2.7 percent.9
6 The H-statistic is an widely used empirical measure of industry market power, allowing a distinction
to be made between monopoly (H · 0), monopolistic competition (0 < H < 1) and perfect competition
(H = 1). In banking, it can be computed as the sum of the elasticities of interest revenues with respect
to factor input prices.
7 As explained in Section 4, demand elasticities pin down the (steady-state) spreads between the loans
and the policy rate and between the latter and the deposit rate. Thus, we calibrate elasticities so as to
replicate the empirical margins observed between those rates in the euro area over our sample period.
8 Our calibration is actually likely to overstate the e®ect of market power as we disregard liquidity
and/or risk premia that might be embedded in retail bank rates. This implies that we regard our
calibrated elasticities as lower bounds when we compare them to estimates from the literature.
9 In order to quantify the degree of market power that we assume in the model and to assess how
10The second \unconventional" assumption we make about the banking sector is that
bank interest rates are \sticky", i.e. they react slowly to changes in the corresponding
market rates (or in the policy rate). Both theoretical and empirical ¯ndings strongly
support this assumption. From a theoretical point of view, for example, a bank could
¯nd it optimal to adjust rates only infrequently if customers' demand is inelastic in the
short run due to switching costs (Calem et al., 2006) or if there are ¯xed (\menu") costs
of adjusting rates (Berger and Hannan, 1991). Moreover, the importance of preserving
customer relationships could lead banks to smooth rates over the business cycle, in or-
der to shield borrowers from market rate °uctuations; this kind of \implicit interest rate
insurance" enables banks to enjoy higher pro¯ts by charging higher interest rates during
periods of low market interest rates (Berger and Udell, 1992). From an empirical stand-
point, in addition to the bankers' practice of indexing bank rates to past values of some
corresponding market rate { which in principle can generate sluggishness by itself { the
empirical evidence in favor of bank rate stickiness is overwhelming. This is con¯rmed
by several recent analyses of the euro area, including that by Kok S¿rensen and Werner
(2006) comparing interest rate pass-through across euro-area countries for various loan
and deposit instruments, which ¯nds that, even in the country with the highest speed
of adjustment, only 23% of the disequilibrium is adjusted after one period. In a related
paper, Gropp et al. (2007) report that deposit rates adjust more slowly than lending rates
and that, in general, the speed of adjustment is in°uenced by the degree of competition,
both from other banks and from ¯nancial markets. De Bondt (2005) reports area-wide
evidence of limited impact and ¯rst-year pass-through both from o±cial rates to market
rates and from market rates to bank rates.10 Nakajima and Teranishi (2009) estimate loan
rate curves using a structural model which is similar to ours, insofar as it features mo-
nopolistic competition in the banking sector with Calvo-adjustment of loan rates. Their
results con¯rm that loan rates adjust slowly to changes in the policy rate in euro-area
countries for all loan maturities in their sample.
In order to introduce sticky rates we assume in our model that banks face quadratic
adjustment costs µ a la Rotemberg whenever they change the level of retail rates. We are
aware that this assumption is somewhat ad hoc and leaves the issue of the microfoundation
of stickiness basically unresolved. However, there is no di®erence between this and the
standard assumption of costly price adjustment in goods markets, which is crucial in New
Keynesian DSGE models: assuming these adjustment costs is just a modeling short-cut
to capture a stylized fact in a tractable way. In addition, we do not impose a sticky
reasonable this assumption is, we calculated the H-statistic implied by the estimated version of our model,
simulating 10,000 observations for loan interest revenues and loan input prices. We obtain a value of 0.54,
which is very similar to the standard ¯ndings in the empirical literature (see Claessens and Laeven, 2004,
or Bikker and Haaf, 2002).
10 The paper also contains a survey of results from several studies on interest rate pass-through in
individual euro-area countries, all delivering the same message of vastly incomplete pass-through over the
same horizon.
11rate adjustment a priori, but the parameters pinning down the degree of stickiness (·bH,
·bE and ·d, for household and entrepreneur loans, and for deposits, respectively) are
estimated based on euro area data (see Section 4 and Appendix B). This procedure leaves
us con¯dent with the assumption of Rotemberg pricing, as it is useful to reconcile model
dynamics with observed data. And the data tell us that rates are indeed sticky: our
estimates imply a short-run pass-through of policy rates to bank interest rates within the
range of the estimates obtained by ECB (2009b).11
The estimated stickiness is \genuine" in the sense that it does not re°ect compositional
issues or the choice of a particular type of bank rates for the estimation. The data
employed refer to new-business coverage, i.e. they are average rates on newly-issued loans
in a given quarter, both for deposits and for loans. These rates do not embed sluggishness
just by construction, as would have been the case if we had used rates on outstanding
loans that are heavily in°uenced by rates set in the past. In this sense it seems that the
rate stickiness we found in the data mostly re°ects banks' optimizing behavior.
3 The model economy
The economy is populated by two types of households and by entrepreneurs. Households
consume, work and accumulate housing (in ¯xed supply), while entrepreneurs produce a
homogenous intermediate good using capital bought from capital-good producers and la-
bor supplied by households. The three types of agents di®er in their degree of impatience,
i.e. in the discount factor they apply to the stream of future utility.
Two types of one-period ¯nancial instruments, supplied by banks, are available to
agents: saving assets (deposits) and loans. When taking out a bank loan, agents face
a borrowing constraint, tied to the value of tomorrow's collateral holdings: households
can borrow against their stock of housing, while entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity is tied
to the value of their physical capital. The heterogeneity in agents' discount factors de-
termines positive ¯nancial °ows in equilibrium: patient households purchase a positive
amount of deposits and do not borrow, while impatient households and entrepreneurs bor-
row a positive amount of loans. The banking sector operates in a regime of monopolistic
competition: banks set interest rates on deposits and on loans so as to maximize pro¯ts.
The amount of loans issued by each intermediary can be ¯nanced through the amount of
deposits that they raise and through bank capital (accumulated out of reinvested pro¯ts).
On the production side, workers supply their di®erentiated labor services through
unions which set wages to maximize members' utility subject to adjustment costs. In
addition to entrepreneurs producing the intermediate good, there are two additional pro-
11 In ECB (2009b), the immediate pass-through (de¯ned as the ratio of the impact change in bank
rate to the impact change in the policy rate after a monetary policy) is estimated (depending on the
maturity) at between 0.17 and 0.36 for household mortgages and between 0.30 and 0.72 for ¯rm loans,
and (depending on the speci¯c instrument) between 0.06 and 0.50 for deposits.
12ducing sectors: a monopolistically competitive retail sector and a capital good producing
sector. Retailers buy the intermediate goods from entrepreneurs in a competitive market,
di®erentiate and price them subject to nominal rigidities. Capital good producers are
used as a modeling device to derive a market price for capital, which determines the value
of entrepreneurs' available collateral, against which banks grant loans.
In the following sections we describe in detail the banking setup and the problems of
households and entrepreneurs. The rest of the model is set out in Appendix A.
3.1 Households and entrepreneurs
There are two groups of households, patient (P) and impatient (I), and one of en-
trepreneurs (E). Each of these groups has unit mass. The only di®erence between the
¯rst two is that the discount factor of patient households (¯P) is higher than that of the
impatient ones (¯I, assumed to be equal to entrepreneurs ¯E). This di®erence makes
savers the agents with a low discount factor, and borrowers the others.
3.1.1 Patient households

























which depends on current individual (and lagged aggregate) consumption cP
t , housing
services hP
t and hours worked lP
t . There are external and group-speci¯c habits in con-
sumption; premultiplication by one minus the habit coe±cient aP mutes their impact
on the steady-state marginal utility of consumption. Preferences are subject to two dis-
turbances: one a®ecting consumption ("z
t) and one housing demand ("h
t).12 Household





















The °ow of expenses includes current consumption, accumulation of housing services
(with real price qh




t is the real wage rate for the labor input of each patient
household), gross interest income on last period deposits (1 + rd
t¡1)dt¡1=¼t (where ¼t ´
Pt=Pt¡1 is the gross in°ation) and a number of lump-sum transfers tP
t , which include a
12 With the exception of a white noise for monetary policy, we assume that any generic shock "t in the
model follows a stochastic AR(1) process of the type
"t = (1 ¡ ½") ¹ " + ½" "t¡1 + ´"
t
where ½" is the autoregressive coe±cient, ¹ " is the steady-state value and ´"
t is an i.i.d. zero mean normal
random variable with standard deviation equal to ¾".
13labor union membership net fee and dividends from ¯rms and banks (of which patient
households are the only owners).
3.1.2 Impatient households

























which depends on consumption cI
t, housing services hI
t and hours worked lI
t. The parame-
ter aI measures consumption habits; "h
t and "z
t are the same shocks that a®ect the utility




















in which resources spent for consumption, accumulation of housing services and reim-
bursement of past borrowing bI
t¡1 (at rate rbH
t¡1) have to be ¯nanced with labor income
(wI
t is the impatients' wage) and new loans bI
t (tI
t only includes net union fees).
In addition, households face a borrowing constraint: the expected value of their col-
lateralizable housing stock at period t must be high enough to guarantee lenders of debt




















t is the (stochastic) loan-to-value ratio (LTV) for mortgages. From a microe-
conomic point of view, (1-mI
t) can be interpreted as the proportional cost of collateral
repossession for banks in case default should occur. At a macro-level, the value of mI
t
determines the amount of credit that banks make available to households, for a given (dis-
counted) value of their housing stock. We assume that variations of LTV ratios do not
depend on individual bank choices: rather, we model LTV ratios as exogenous stochastic
processes, whose innovations will allow us to study the e®ects of credit-supply restrictions
on the real side of the economy.
3.1.3 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur i only cares about deviations of his own consumption cE
t (i) from ag-












by choosing consumption, physical capital kE
t , loans from banks bE
t , the degree of capacity
utilization ut and the desired amount of labor input lE



































where ± is depreciation, qk
t is the price of one unit of physical capital in terms of consump-
tion, Ã(ut)kE
t¡1 is the real cost of setting a level ut of utilization rate, P W
t =Pt = 1=xt is the














t being a stochastic process for total factor productivity. Aggregate labor lE
t






Symmetrically with respect to households, we assume that the amount of resources
that banks are willing to lend entrepreneurs is constrained by the value of their collateral,
which is given by their holdings of physical capital. This assumption di®ers from Iacoviello
(2005), where entrepreneurs also borrow against housing (commercial real estate), but
it seems a more realistic modeling choice, as overall balance-sheet conditions give the













t is the stochastic entrepreneurs' LTV ratio. Our assumption on discount factors
is such that, in the absence of uncertainty, the borrowing constraints of both impatient
households and entrepreneurs are binding in a neighborhood of the steady state. As
in Iacoviello (2005), we assume that the size of the shocks in the model is \su±ciently
small"to remain in this neighborhood, and we can thus solve our model imposing that
the borrowing constraints always bind.
3.1.4 Loans and deposits demand
To model market power in the banking industry, we assume a Dixit-Stiglitz framework for
the credit market.13 In particular, we assume that units of deposits and of loan contracts
bought by households and entrepreneurs are a composite CES basket of slightly di®eren-




t , respectively. We assume that these elasticities of substitution
among contracts o®ered by di®erent banks are stochastic. This choice arises from our in-




t) a®ect the value of the markups (markdowns) that banks
charge when setting interest rates and, consequently, the value of the spreads between the
13 A similar shortcut is taken by Benes and Lees (2007). Andr¶ es and Arce (2009) set up a general
equilibrium model featuring a ¯nite number of imperfectly competitive banks whereby the greater the
customers' distance from a bank the more costly the services from that bank.
15policy rate and the retail loan (deposit) rates. Innovations to the loan (deposit) markup
(markdown) can thus be interpreted as innovations to bank spreads arising independently
of monetary policy and we can take account of their e®ects on the real economy.
The demands for loans to households bI
t(j), loans to entrepreneurs bE
t (j) and deposits
dt(j) at bank j will depend on overall volumes and on the interest rates charged by bank




































Banks play a central role in our model since they act as an intermediary for all ¯nancial
transactions between agents in the model. The only saving instrument available to patient
households is bank deposits, while the only way to borrow, for impatient households and
entrepreneurs, is by applying for a bank loan.
One key ingredient in how we model banks is the introduction of monopolistic compe-
tition at the banking retail level. Banks enjoy market power in conducting their interme-
diation activity, which allows them to adjust rates on loans and deposits in response to
shocks or other cyclical conditions in the economy. The imperfect competition setup al-
lows us to study how di®erent degrees of interest rate pass-through a®ect the transmission
of shocks, in particular of monetary policy shocks.
Another key feature of our banks is that each has to obey a balance sheet identity
Bt = Dt + K
b
t
stating that each bank can ¯nance loans Bt using either deposits Dt or bank equity (here-
inafter also called bank capital) Kb
t.14 The two sources of ¯nance are perfect substitutes
from the point of view of the balance sheet. Banks' choice will be pinned down by a
further assumption of an (exogenously given) \optimal" capital-to-assets (i.e. leverage)
ratio from which it is costly to deviate, which can be thought of as capturing the trade-o®s
that, in a more structural model, would arise in the decision of how much own resources
to hold, or alternatively as a shortcut for studying the implications and costs of regula-
tory capital requirements. Given this assumption, bank capital will have a key role in
determining the conditions of credit supply, both for quantities and for prices. Further-
more, since we assume that bank capital is accumulated out of retained earnings, banks
in the model are at the center of a feedback loop between the real and the ¯nancial side of
14 When taking the model to the data we add a shock "kb
t to liabilities in order to avoid near-stochastic
singularity in the estimation.
16the economy. As macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, banks pro¯ts and hence capital
might be negatively hit; depending on the nature of the shock that hits the economy,
banks might respond to the ensuing weakening of their ¯nancial position (i.e. increased
leverage) by reducing the amount of loans they are willing to extend to the private sector,
thus exacerbating the original contraction. The model might thus potentially account for
the type of \credit cycle" typically observed in recent recession episodes, with a weakening
real economy, a reduction of bank pro¯ts, a weakening of banks' capital positions and the
ensuing credit restriction.
Modeling banks' leverage position and rate-setting activity on loans subject to collateral
requirements allows us to introduce a number of shocks that originate from the supply
side of credit and thus to study their e®ects and their propagation to the real economy.
In particular, we can study the e®ects of a drastic weakening in the balance sheet position
of the banking sector, or the e®ect of an exogenous rise in loans rates or LTV ratios.
To highlight more clearly the distinctive features of our banking sector and to facilitate
exposition, we can think of each bank j (j 2 [0;1]) in the model as actually composed of
three parts, two \retail" branches and one \wholesale" unit. The ¯rst retail branch is re-
sponsible for giving out di®erentiated loans to impatient households and to entrepreneurs;
the second, for raising di®erentiated deposits from patient households. These branches set
rates in a monopolistic competitive fashion, subject to adjustment costs. The wholesale
unit manages the capital position of the group.
3.2.1 Wholesale branch
Each wholesale branch operates under perfect competition and combines net worth, or
bank capital (Kb
t), and wholesale deposits (Dt) on the liability side, and issues wholesale
loans (Bt) on the asset side. We impose a cost on this wholesale activity related to the
capital position of the bank. In particular, the bank pays a quadratic cost (parameterized
by a coe±cient ·Kb and proportional to outstanding bank capital) whenever the capital-
to-assets ratio Kb
t=Bt moves away from an \optimal" or target value ºb. This parameter
is usually set equal to 0:09 in our numerical experiments, a level consistent with much of
the regulatory capital requirements for banks, and which is also meant to strike a balance
among the various trade-o®s involved when deciding how much own resources a bank
should hold.














t are overall pro¯ts made by the three branches of each bank, (1¡!b) summarizes
the dividend policy of the bank, and ±b measures resources used in managing bank capital.
The dividend policy is assumed to be exogenously ¯xed, so that bank capital is not a
choice variable for the bank. The problem for the wholesale bank is thus to choose loans










































t (the net wholesale loan rate) and Rd
t (the net wholesale deposit rate) are taken
as given. Using the balance sheet identity (5) twice (at date t and t + 1), the objective




















The FOCs deliver a condition linking the spread between wholesale rates on loans and



















in order to close the model, we assume that banks have access to unlimited ¯nance at
the policy rate rt from a lending facility at the central bank: hence, by arbitrage the
deposit rate is pinned down in the interbank market and Rd
t ´ rt. Therefore, equation
(6) becomes a condition linking the rate on wholesale loans prevailing in the interbank

















The above equation highlights the role of capital in determining loan supply conditions.


















The spread is inversely related to the overall capital-to-assets ratio of banks: in particular,
when banks are scarcely capitalized and leverage increases, margins become wider. On
the one hand, the higher the leverage, the wider (i.e. more positive) the spread between
the wholesale loan rate and the policy rate, the more the bank wants to lend, increasing
pro¯ts per unit of capital (or return on equity). On the other hand, as leverage increases
further, the deviation from º becomes more costly, reducing bank pro¯ts. In this case, the
FOC commands that the optimal choice for banks is to choose a level of loans (and thus of
leverage, given a level of Kb
t) such that the marginal cost of reducing the capital-to-assets
ratio exactly equals the deposit-loan spread.
15 Banks value the future stream of pro¯ts using the patient households stochastic discount factor ¤P
0;t
since they are owned by patient agents.
183.2.2 Retail banking
Retail banks are monopolistic competitors on both the loan and deposit markets.
Loan branch: The retail loan branch of bank j obtains wholesale loans Bt(j) from the
wholesale unit at rate Rb
t, di®erentiates them at no cost and resells them to households
and ¯rms applying two di®erent markups. In order to introduce stickiness and to study
the implication of an imperfect bank pass-through, we assume that each retail bank faces
quadratic adjustment costs for changing the rates it charges on loans; these costs are
parameterized by ·bE and ·bH and are proportional to aggregate returns on loans. Retail





















































subject to demand schedules (3) and with Bt(j) = bt(j) = bI
t(j) + bE
t (j). For rates to
















































t denoting the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint of a patient household.
For the simpli¯ed case in which "bs
t = "bs, the log-linearized version of the loan-rate setting



















By solving the equation forward, one could see that loan rates are set by banks based
on current and expected future values of the wholesale bank rate, which is the relevant
marginal cost for this type of bank and which depends on the policy rate and the capital
position of the bank, as highlighted in the previous section. The adjustment to changes in
the wholesale rate depends inversely on the intensity of the adjustment costs (as measured
by ·bs) and positively on the degree of competition in the bank loans sector (as measured
by the inverse of "bs).











and interest rates on loans are set as a simple markup over the marginal cost. We can

















19with the last equality obtained by combining (10) with the expression in (7). The spread
on retail loans is thus increasing in the policy rate, and is proportional to the whole-
sale spread SW
t , determined by the bank's capital position. In addition, the degree of
monopolistic competition also plays a role, given that an increase in market power (i.e.
a reduction in the elasticity of substitution "bs
t ) determines { ceteris paribus { a wider
absolute spread. This relation between the elasticity and the loan spread allows us to
interpret shocks to "bs
t , which we model as a stochastic process, as exogenous innovations
to the bank loan margin.
Deposit branch: Similarly, the retail deposit branch of bank j collects deposits dt(j)
from households and then passes the raised funds to the wholesale unit, which remunerates



























subject to deposits demand (4) and with Dt(j) = dt(j). Quadratic adjustment costs for
changing the deposit rate are parameterized by the coe±cient ·d and are proportional to
aggregate interest paid on deposits. After imposing a symmetric equilibrium, the ¯rst-


























































1 + "d + (1 + ¯P)·d
^ rt
The deposit rate is set by banks taking into account the expected future level of the policy
rate. The adjustment to changes in the policy rate depends inversely on how severe are
the adjustment costs (i.e. on ·d) and positively on the degree of competition in banks
fund raising (as measured by the inverse of "d).
With fully °exible rates, rd









Overall the real pro¯ts of a bank are the sum of net earnings (intermediation margins
minus other costs) from the wholesale unit and the retail branches. After deleting the





























t (j) indicates adjustment costs for changing interest rates on loans and deposits.
204 Estimation
4.1 Methodology and data
We linearize the equations describing the model around the steady state. The solution
takes the form of a state-space model that is used to compute the likelihood function.
We use a Bayesian approach and choose prior distributions for the parameters which are
added to the likelihood function; the estimation of the implied posterior distribution of
the parameters is done using the Metropolis algorithm (see Smets and Wouters, 2007,
and Adolfson et al., 2007).16 We use twelve observables: real consumption, real invest-
ment, real house prices, real deposits, real loans to households and ¯rms, overnight rate,
interest rates on deposits, loans to ¯rms and households, wage in°ation and consumer
price in°ation. For a description of the data see Appendix B. The sample period runs
from 1998:Q1 to 2009:Q1. We remove the trend from the variables using the HP ¯lter
with smoothing parameter set at 1,600 (while all rates are simply demeaned). We also
estimated the model with linearly detrended data and obtained very similar results in
terms of the posterior distribution of parameters.
We estimate the parameters that a®ect the dynamics of the model and calibrate those
determining the steady state so to obtain reasonable values for key steady-state values
and ratios. Table 1 reports the values of the calibrated parameters.
4.2 Calibrated parameters and prior distributions
Calibrated parameters - We set the patients' discount factor at 0.9943, in order to
obtain a steady-state interest rate on deposits slightly above 2 per cent on an annual
basis, in line with the average monthly rate on M2 deposits in the euro area over the
sample period. As for impatient households' and entrepreneurs' discount factors ¯I and
¯E, we set them at 0.975, in the range suggested by Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and
Neri (2009). The mean value of the weight of housing in households' utility function "h
is set at 0.2, close to the value in Iacoviello and Neri (2009). As for the loan-to-value
(LTV) steady-state ratios, we set mI at 0.7 in line with evidence for mortgages in the
main euro-area countries (typically, 0.7 in Germany and Spain, 0.75 in France and 0.5 in
Italy), as pointed out by Calza et al. (2009). The calibration of mE is somewhat more
problematic: Iacoviello (2005) estimates a value of 0.89 for the U.S., but in his model only
commercial real estate can be collateralized; Christensen et al. (2007) estimate a much
lower value (0.32) in a model for Canada, where ¯rms can borrow against business capital.
Using our data set, we compute for the euro area an average ratio of long-term loans to
the value of shares and other equities for the non-¯nancial corporations sector of around
0.41; using short-term instead of long-term loans we obtain a lower value of around 0.2.
16 Our estimation is done with Dynare 4.0.
21Based on this evidence, and given that in our estimation we use rates on loans to ¯rms
with original rate ¯xation above 1 year, we decide to set mE at 0.35.
The capital share is set at 0.25 and the depreciation rate at 0.025. In the labor market
we assume a markup of 15 per cent and set "l at 5. In the goods market, a value of
6 for "y in steady state delivers a markup of 20 percent, a value commonly used in the
literature. We specify Ã(ut) = »1(ut ¡ 1) +
»2
2 (ut ¡ 1)2 as in Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe
(2006): »1 is constrained by the model to be equal to the steady-state marginal product
of capital divided by the markup, while nonlinearity is limited by setting »2 = 0:1»1. The
labor inputs Cobb-Douglas parameter ¹ is calibrated at 0.8 so to approximate the labor
income share of unconstrained households as in Iacoviello and Neri (2009).
For the banking parameters, no corresponding estimate is available with precision in
the literature. Thus, we calibrate them so as to replicate some statistical properties
of bank interest rates and spreads. Equation (13) shows that the steady-state spread
between the deposit rate and the interbank rate depends only on "d
t; thus, to calibrate "d
we calculate the average monthly spread between retail deposit rates in our sample and
the Eonia, which corresponds to around 125 basis points in annualized terms, implying
that "d = ¡1:46. Similarly, we calibrate "bH
t and "bE
t to 2:79 and 3:12 by exploiting
the steady-state relation between the marginal cost of loan production and households
and ¯rms loan rates. The steady-state ratio of bank capital to total loans (BH
t + BE
t ) is
set at 0.09, slightly above the capital requirements imposed by the Basel Accords. The
parameter ±b is set at the value (0.1049), which ensures that the ratio of bank capital to
total loans is exactly 0.09.
Prior distributions - Our priors are listed in Tables 2A and 2B. Overall, they are
either consistent with the previous literature or relatively uninformative. For the per-
sistence parameters, we choose a beta-distribution with a prior mean of 0.8 and a stan-
dard deviation of 0.1. We set the prior mean of the habit parameters in consumption
ah = aP = aI = aE at 0.5 (with a standard error of 0.1). For the monetary policy spec-
i¯cation, we assume prior means for ÁR; Á¼ and Áy equal, respectively, to 0.75, 2.0 and
0.1. We set the prior mean of the parameters measuring the adjustment costs for prices
·p and wages ·w at 50 with a standard deviation of 20. The priors for the indexation
parameters ¶p and ¶w are loosely centered around 0.5, as in Smets and Wouters (2007). As
for the parameters governing interest rates adjustment costs, their prior means are set at
values between 3 and 10, chosen so that the coe±cients in the loglinearized rate-setting
equations imply immediate pass-throughs of the magnitude documented in ECB (2009b);
the standard deviations are set at 2.5. The prior on the banking regulatory parameter
(·Kb) is harder to set and we assume a rather widespread distribution, with a mean of 10
and a standard deviation of 5. We have estimated the model imposing a prior mean for
·Kb of 100 and obtained a posterior median of 40. Similarly when we set the prior mean
at 2.5 the posterior median increased to 4. These results may suggest that the parameter
is somehow identi¯ed in the data and that the overlap between the prior and posterior
22distribution (see Figure 2) is not the result of lack of identi¯cation.
4.3 Posterior estimates
Tables 2A and 2B also report the posterior mean, median and 95 percent probability
intervals for the structural parameters. Draws from the posterior distribution of the
parameters are obtained using the random walk version of the Metropolis algorithm. We
ran ten parallel chains, each with a length of 100,000. The scale factor was set in order
to deliver acceptance rates of between 20 and 30 percent. Convergence was assessed by
means of the multivariate convergence statistics taken from Brooks and Gelman (1998)
and also computing recursive means of the model's parameters. Figures 2 and 3 report
the prior and posterior marginal densities of the parameters of the model, excluding the
standard deviation of the innovations of the shocks.
All shocks are quite persistent with the only exception of the price markup shock.
The posterior mean of the parameter measuring the degree of consumption habits is
estimated to be high, at 0.85. For monetary policy, our estimation con¯rms the weak
identi¯cation of the response to in°ation (see Figure 3) and the relatively large degree
of policy rate inertia; moreover, the posterior median of the coe±cient measuring the
response to output growth is more than three times the prior mean. Concerning nominal
rigidities, we ¯nd that wage stickiness is more important than price stickiness. The degree
of price indexation is relatively low (the median is 0.16) and con¯rms the ¯nding of Benati
(2008) who documents a low degree of indexation in the euro area in the single currency
period. Concerning the parameters measuring the degree of stickiness in bank rates, we
¯nd that deposit rates adjust more rapidly than the rates on loans to changes in the policy
rate. This result is not surprising given that our measure of deposits include time deposits,
whose interest rates are typically highly reactive to changes in money market rates. We
have estimated a version of the model with °exible bank rates and found that the log of
the marginal density is substantially lower than the corresponding one for the benchmark
model (by around 50), suggesting that stickiness is a key feature of bank rates in the euro
area. Finally, the posterior distribution for ·Kb stays very close to the chosen prior. As
already mentioned, we experimented with larger and smaller values for the mean of the
prior distribution. These experiments suggest that this parameter is partially identi¯ed
in the data, in the sense that in these cases the posterior distribution moves away from
the prior one.
5 Properties of the estimated model
In this Section we study the dynamics of the linearized model using impulse responses,
focusing on a contractionary monetary policy shock and on an expansionary technology
innovation. Our aim is to assess whether and how the transmission mechanism of mone-
23tary and technology shocks is a®ected by the presence of ¯nancial frictions and ¯nancial
intermediation.
The benchmark model, described in Section 3, introduces ¯nancial intermediation in
a framework that already features a number of transmission channels for monetary im-
pulses, which are usually at work in models with heterogeneous agents and borrowing
constraints. In that category of models, the traditional interest rate channel is modi¯ed
by the fact that only a fraction of the population (patient agents) are willing to postpone
consumption when the real rate rises, and is accompanied by three additional channels,
as listed, for example, in Calza et al. (2009): (i) a nominal-debt channel, whereby, as in-
terest and principal payments are in nominal terms, changes in in°ation a®ect the ex-post
distribution of resources across borrowers and lenders; (ii) a collateral-constraint channel,
whereby an innovation in the policy rate changes the shadow value of borrowing and
therefore impacts on consumption; (iii) an asset-price e®ect, whereby induced changes
in asset prices alter the value of the collateral that agents can pledge. Iacoviello (2005),
among others, has shown that these channels can amplify and propagate the transmission
of monetary impulses, when compared to standard models with representative agents
and frictionless ¯nancial markets. Due to the interest-rate setting behavior of banks,
our model features an intermediation spread, whose movements alter the pass-through of
changes in the policy rate to bank rates, which are the relevant rates for consumption and
investment decisions. This mechanism modi¯es the e®ectiveness of the abovementioned
transmission channels. In particular, credit market power and the ensuing markup be-
tween lending rates and the policy rate amplify changes in the policy rate for borrowers
(i.e. impatient households and entrepreneurs), while the markdown between the policy
and the deposit rate implies an attenuating e®ect for lenders (i.e. patient agents). Sticky
interest rates, instead, unambiguously induce an attenuation e®ect (with respect to a
°exible-rate setup), as banks translate changes in the policy rate to borrowing and lend-
ing rates only partially. Finally, the impact of bank capital depends on the correlation
between bank leverage (i.e. the inverse of the capital-to-asset ratio) and the policy rate:
if bank leverage increases when policy is tightened, then the transmission of shocks to
the real economy is ampli¯ed; on the contrary, a fall in leverage during periods of policy
tightening smooths °uctuations in the real economy. Given these facts, the overall im-
pact of ¯nancial intermediation on the transmission mechanism depends on the relative
importance and the mutual interactions of the heterogenous e®ects on the various agents.
Overall, we ¯nd that after a monetary policy shock ¯nancial intermediation attenuates
the response of real variables, mainly re°ecting the presence of sticky bank rates. Also
after a technology innovation banking somewhat dampens the response of output, mainly
due to the impact of monopolistic power on consumption; in this case, however, banking
also enhances the endogenous propagation mechanism of the model.
245.1 Monetary policy shock
The transmission of a monetary policy shock is studied ¯rst by analyzing the impulse
responses to an unanticipated 50 basis points exogenous shock to the policy rate (rt).
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses, with parameter values set at the estimated posterior
median. The red line (BK in the ¯gure) plots impulse responses of the benchmark model,
described in Section 3. In order to decompose the contribution of each distinctive feature
of banking at work in that model, in the charts we compare the BK model with a number
of other models, where we progressively shut down those features:17 (i) a model with
sticky bank rates (SR model) where we get rid of bank capital, i.e. a model with a
simpli¯ed balance sheet for banks that includes only deposits on the liability side;18 (ii)
a model where we also remove stickiness in bank rate setting, i.e. we allow for °exible
rates (FR in the ¯gure); 19 (iii) a model where we eliminate market power for banks, i.e.
where we assume that ¯nancial intermediaries operate in perfect competition; this model
can be interpreted as a standard ¯nancial frictions framework, like Iacoviello (2005; FF
in the ¯gure);20 (iv) a model where we also remove the assets-price and nominal-debt
channels, in order to obtain a setup as similar as possible to the New Keynesian standard
(a "Quasi-New Keynesian" model - QNK).21
In our benchmark model (BK), the presence of ¯nancial intermediation and capital
constraints does not qualitatively alter the responses of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables, when compared to standard results in the New Keynesian literature (QNK) or in
a model with ¯nancial frictions (FF). Therefore, our model continues to be able to repli-
cate stylized business cycle facts while having the advantage of introducing new elements
which realistically enrich the set of inter-linkages between macroeconomic and ¯nancial
variables. In the face of a policy tightening, output and in°ation contract (inducing a
partial endogenous unwinding of the policy rate). Real interest rates for households and
entrepreneurs go up, re°ecting the increase in bank interest rates, and asset prices decline,
determining a reduction in the present discounted value of collateral and a fall in lending,
to both households and ¯rms. On impact, bank pro¯ts get pushed up by the increase
in banks' intermediation spread, which more than o®sets the reduction in the amount of
17 Thus, the contribution of the various features is obtained as the di®erence in the responses among
the models. It would be possible to re-estimate each model and perform the same comparison. However,
in this case, all the parameters would change in order to ¯t the data and, therefore, it would not be
possible to attribute any change in the propagation mechanism of shocks to a speci¯c feature of the
model.
18 In order to do so, we force the parameter ·Kb to be equal to 0 and we rebate banking pro¯ts to
patient households in a lump-sum fashion.
19 Operationally, we set the costs to change rates ·bH, ·bE and ·d to zero.
20 This model is obtained by assuming that the elasticities of substitution for loans and deposits all
equal in¯nity.
21 It is quasi NK since agents are still constrained in borrowing, although it is assumed that there is
no e®ect of price °uctuations on the value of the collateral (which is kept ¯xed at the steady state level)
and that loans and deposits (plus interests) are repaid in real terms.
25intermediated funds; after a few quarters, however, pro¯ts turn negative as bank margin
increases unwind while loans and deposits remain negative for longer. Following pro¯ts,
bank capital initially increases but it then turns negative after about ten quarters.
From a quantitative point of view, however, the BK model di®ers substantially from
the FF model where a single interest rate exists. In particular, the contractionary e®ect
of the policy tightening is attenuated in the BK model. This e®ect is due to the presence
of sticky bank rates, which dampen the response of retail loan rates, thus reducing the
contraction in loans, consumption and investment (see the di®erence between the SR
and the FR lines in Figure 4). The impact of market power (i.e. the di®erence between
the FR and FF lines) on output is rather limited, re°ecting the di®erentiated e®ects
on borrowers and lenders, which almost mutually o®set each other in the aggregate. In
particular, the loan-interest rate markup determines a bigger increase of the relevant
rates for impatient households and entrepreneurs in the FR model, while the markdown
for the deposit rate attenuates the restriction for patient households. As a consequence,
borrowers' consumption and investment decline by more (in FR with respect to FF),
while savers' consumption decreases by less. Finally, the introduction of a link between
the capital position of banks and the spread on loans has, instead, virtually no e®ect on
the dynamics of the real variables (as represented by the di®erences between the BK and
the SR lines); this partly re°ects the small value estimated for the parameter ·Kb, which
{ as mentioned before { we use to perform this exercise.22
Our ¯ndings on the presence of an overall attenuating e®ect of banking after a monetary
policy shock are in line with the results obtained by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).
In their model, the attenuation e®ect stems from the presence of procyclical marginal
costs and occurs only when the monetary impulse is very persistent. The attenuation
e®ect in our model is more general, as bank rate adjustment is sluggish irrespective of the
persistence of monetary shocks. A similar attenuator e®ect also arises in Andr¶ es and Arce
(2009) and Aslam and Santoro (2008). In these models, this e®ect is mainly the result
of a steady-state spread in the banking sector due to imperfectly competitive ¯nancial
intermediation: we share the same result, but we highlight that it is the outcome of an
ampli¯cation e®ect on borrowers and an attenuation e®ect on savers. Christiano et al.
(2008) present a model with ¯nancial intermediaries. Their banks are rather di®erent
compared to ours, as they operate under perfect competition and therefore cannot set
retail interest rates. Regarding the monetary transmission mechanism, they ¯nd that the
presence of banks and ¯nancial frictions magni¯es the response of output and induces
higher persistence; however, they also ¯nd that banks play a marginal role in propagating
the monetary impulse while the ¯nancial accelerator is more important.
22 For example, our parameters imply that a reduction of the capital-to-assets ratio by half (from its
steady state-value of 9%) would increase the spread between the wholesale loan rate and the policy rate
by around 10 basis points only.
265.2 Technology shock
The transmission of a technology shock is studied by looking at the impulse responses
coming from the same set of models illustrated in the previous paragraph. Figure 5 shows
the simulated responses of the main macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables following a
shock to aE
t equal in size to the estimated standard deviation of TFP.
In line with the basic ¯nancial frictions setup µ a la Iacoviello (2005; FF), in our bench-
mark model the expansion which follows a positive technology shock is boosted by a
¯nancial acceleration mechanism and, at the same time, dampened by a debt de°ation ef-
fect. With respect to Iacoviello's model, the presence of imperfectly competitive ¯nancial
intermediation ampli¯es both of these channels, while sticky rates and bank capital alter
the picture only marginally. Overall, a dampening e®ect prevails on impact, so that con-
sumption and output in the three models with banking (FR, SR, BK) feature a common
attenuation in the ¯rst few quarters, more intense than the one prevailing in the FF case;
but, as policy and loan rates decrease more in response, real variables display a higher
persistence: output reaches a peak after about ten quarters, as compared to seven in the
FF model.
With respect to the ¯nancial acceleration mechanism, the existence of markups on loan
rates provides an amplifying contribution to the expansion following the technology shock.
The usual downward pressure on prices determined by the shock induces a policy rate cut:
with imperfectly competitive banking, interest rates on loans fall even more, by a measure
of the markup. Thus, investment is boosted both by the technological improvement and
by a particularly eased access to credit. The accumulation of physical capital (and also of
housing by impatient households) pushes asset prices up, so that borrowers also bene¯t
from the wider access to credit that higher collateral value a®ords.
With respect to the debt de°ation mechanism, this expansionary e®ect is somewhat
dampened by the fact that debt contracts are signed in nominal terms and with rate-
setting banks. In fact, de°ation increases the real value of debt obligations and limits
resources available to borrowers, both directly and through second-round asset-price ef-
fects on the collateral value. In our models where the banking sector is imperfectly
competitive, markups applied on loan rates raise the cost of debt servicing: a given de-
°ation leaves debtors with a higher burden of real debt obligations which weigh more on
their resources and on their spending, so that the dampening of the supply shock due to
the existence of nominal debt is initially stronger.
The market power enjoyed by banks also plays a role in the delayed propagation of a
technological improvement. The initially stronger attenuation of demand exerts additional
downward pressure on prices, triggering a more aggressive reduction of the policy rate
in the ¯rst year, and the existence of markups induces an even stronger reduction of
loan rates, which reach a minimum by the end of the ¯rst year. This improvement in
credit conditions boosts real activity: in particular, it allows entrepreneurs to expand
investment further, which in turn induces a higher price of capital and hence higher
27collateral valuations, reinforcing the initial e®ect. As labor becomes more productive,
entrepreneurs increase labor demand too. Wages set by impatient households, initially
moderated by the adverse wealth e®ect, also increase with a lag, and so does consumption
for this group of agents. Overall, the dynamics of consumption and investment are delayed
with respect to the FF setup, and this translates into a higher persistence in output.
The presence of sticky interest rates limits the reduction of bank rates, and hence the
expansion of lending and aggregate demand, but overall it only marginally a®ects the
impulse responses of the main real variables (see the di®erence between the SR and the
FR lines). Finally, the presence of bank capital mainly a®ects the behavior of investment
(see the di®erence between the BK and the SR lines), by establishing a link between
the amount of credit available to ¯rms and bank pro¯ts. In fact, investment peaks at
around 40% below the level achieved under the SR model, mainly because lending is now
restrained by the fall in bank capital that follows a contraction of bank pro¯ts. In turn,
the decline in pro¯ts is related to the endogenous countercyclical response of the interest
rate margin (the di®erential between loan and deposit rates), which is the main source of
bank pro¯ts.23
6 Applications
Once the model has been estimated and its propagation mechanism studied, we can use
it to address the two applied issues raised in the Introduction. First, what role did the
shocks originating in the banking system play in the dynamics of the main variables
since the outbreak of the ¯nancial crisis? Second, what are the e®ects of a credit crunch
originating from a fall in bank capital?
6.1 The role of ¯nancial shocks in the business cycle
In order to quantify the relative importance of each shock in the model we perform a
historical decomposition of the dynamics of the main macro and ¯nancial variables of the
euro area. This decomposition was obtained by ¯xing the parameters of the model at
the posterior median and then using the Kalman smoother to obtain the values of the
innovations for each shock. The aim of the exercise is twofold: on the one hand, we want
to investigate how our ¯nancially-rich model interprets the slowdown in 2008 and thus
learn from the model which shocks were mainly responsible for it. On the other hand,
to the extent that the overall story told by the model is consistent with the conventional
wisdom that has emerged so far about the origins and causes of the current crisis, we can
use this experiment as an indirect misspeci¯cation test for our model.
23 Empirically, the di®erential between loan and deposit rates is countercyclical. See, for example,
Aliaga-D¶ ³az and Olivero (2008) for evidence on the U.S.
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groups. First, there is a \macroeconomic"group, which pools shocks to production tech-
nology, to intertemporal preferences, to housing demand, to investment-speci¯c technol-
ogy, and to price and wage markups. Next, the \monetary policy" group isolates the
contribution of the non-systematic conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the \¯nancial"
group consists of shocks originating in the credit sector: these are the shocks to the
loan-to-value ratios on loans to ¯rms and households, the shocks to the markup on bank
interest rates and the shock to balance sheets.
Figure 6 shows the results of the exercise for some key macro variables. Concerning
output (de¯ned as the sum of consumption and investment) the results of the historical
decomposition suggest that macro and ¯nancial shocks were primary drivers behind the
rise of 2006-2007, while the sharp slowdown of 2008 was essentially caused by ¯nancial
shocks.24 These a®ected the real economy mainly through their e®ect on investment and
the decomposition of that variable con¯rms how unusually large (positive) shocks, mainly
related to ¯rms' LTV ratios, were responsible for the positive performance of investment
in 2006 and 2007 and how these same shocks turned negative in 2008, accounting for the
fall in investment. Macroeconomic shocks also played a role in the slowdown of 2008, in
that their positive contribution to the dynamics of output fell to almost nothing during
2008, after having been quite high the year before. A closer inspection of that category
reveals that an important contributor in this group were price markup shocks. The reason
why these shocks are estimated to be so important at the current juncture is that they are
probably capturing the e®ects of the sharp increase in commodity prices that occurred
in the ¯rst half of 2008. The large contribution of these shocks to in°ation con¯rms
this hypothesis. Turning to the policy rate, the macroeconomic shocks made a positive
contribution in 2008, although the contribution of price markup shocks turned negative
starting in the last quarter; on the other hand, monetary policy shocks are found to have
exerted negative e®ects on the policy rate between the end of 2007 and the third quarter
of 2008. In order to understand these results, one must remember that over this period,
which was characterized by great uncertainty over the consequences of the ¯nancial crisis,
the ECB kept the interest rate on its main re¯nancing operations ¯xed at 4.0 per cent
until July 2008 when it was raised by 25 basis points in order to counteract in°ationary
pressures stemming from the surge in commodity prices. In the second half of 2008, the
contribution of credit sector shocks became predominant, and accounted for the bulk of
the rapid reduction in the policy rate.
In Figure 7 we collect the results of the historical decomposition of loans to households
and ¯rms and the corresponding bank rates. In this case we found it convenient to
divide the \¯nancial" group in three sub-categories: shocks directly related to loans to
24 We obtain quite similar results using linearly detrended data. In this case, only the last two quarters
of the sample show a signi¯cant contribution of ¯nancial shocks to the downturn in economic activity in
the euro area.
29households (i.e., shocks to households' LTV ratios and to interest rate markups on their
loans), shocks directly related to loans to ¯rms, and all other ¯nancial shocks (deposit
rate markup and bank balance sheet shocks). The dynamics of the interest rates on loans
to ¯rms and households were mainly driven by macroeconomic shocks. However, shocks
related to the supply of credit to ¯rms have played an important role in driving up the
rate on loans to ¯rms since 2005, while monetary policy shocks were relatively important
drivers between 2006 and 2007, when the ECB raised the policy rate from the very low
levels reached in June 2003. Loans to ¯rms were driven almost exclusively by shocks
related directly to credit to ¯rms, with the notable exception of 2008 when a negative
contribution came from macroeconomic shocks, among which a signi¯cant role was played,
again, by price markup shocks until the third quarter and, subsequently, by shocks to the
marginal e±ciency of investment. Concerning loans to households, a main driver of its
dynamics turns out to be the housing demand shock (within the macro group), since
it explains most of the strong rise in 2006 and, at a decreasing pace, in 2007, as well
as the subsequent decline in 2008, tracking the house prices cycle. Consistent with the
indications from the Bank Lending Survey for that period, our results explain with lower
loan-to-value ratios the early deceleration of loans to households in the year before the
outbreak of the crisis.
To sum up, the exercise taught us that the credit sector shocks considered in our model
played an important role in shaping the dynamics of the euro area in the last business
cycle and, more importantly, did so in a way that squares nicely with our prior knowledge
and the expert judgement of macroeconomists about what happened.
6.2 The e®ects of a bank capital loss
Starting in the summer of 2007, ¯nancial markets in advanced economies entered a pro-
tracted period of considerable strain. The initial deterioration in the U.S. sub-prime
mortgage market quickly spread across other ¯nancial markets, a®ecting the valuation
of a number of assets. Banks, in particular, su®ered losses from signi¯cant write-o®s on
complex instruments and reported increasing funding di±culties, in connection with the
persisting tensions in the interbank market and with the substantial hampering of securi-
tization activity. A number of them were forced to recapitalize and improve their balance
sheets. In addition, intermediaries reported that concerns over their liquidity and capital
position induced them to tighten credit standards for the approval of loans to the private
sector. Since the October 2007 round, banks participating in the euro area Bank Lending
Survey reported to have considerably tightened their credit standards and, at the same
time, to have strongly increased the margins charged on average loans to households and
¯rms (Figure 1). When asked about the motivations behind these developments, banks
pointed predominantly to the role played by the costs incurred in managing their cap-
ital position (right panels in Figure 1). These survey results therefore vividly picture
a situation in which a negative shock in the US ¯nancial markets generated conditions
30for real e®ects in the euro area via its impact on the capital positions of banks, and on
the availability and cost of bank credit. Against this background, it is of the essence for
policymakers, when evaluating the appropriateness of the monetary policy stance, to be
able to reckon the impact of such bank balance sheets e®ects as to the availability and
cost of credit.
As our model is particularly well suited to analyze such a question, in this section we
use it to study what happens if bank capital su®ers a strong negative shock. In order to
run the simulation, we modify the model introducing the possibility of an unexpected and
persistent contraction in bank capital Kb. We do not attempt to construct a quantitatively
realistic scenario; this would indeed be very di±cult, given the con°icting indications
coming from hard and survey evidence on realized and latent bank capital losses and on
the tightening of credit standards, in particular in the euro area, and given the uncertainty
on the e®ects that have already occurred and on those that might still be in the pipeline.
Instead, we mostly want to study the transmission and ampli¯cation mechanisms that
account for the macroeconomic e®ects of bank capital losses. We calibrate the shock so as
to obtain, on impact, a fall of bank capital equal to 5 percent of its pre-shock level. The
persistence of the shock is set at 0.95 in order to obtain a persistent fall of the capital-
to-assets ratio below its steady state value (9 percent). Figure 8 shows the e®ects of this
experiment using the median of the posterior distribution of the parameters and under
an alternative calibration in which the only di®erence is that it is particularly di±cult
(and costly) to raise new capital, i.e. we increase by a factor of 10 the coe±cient on the
adjustment costs on the capital-to-assets ratio ·Kb (from an estimate that is slightly below
10).
In the benchmark case, the decline in bank liabilities following the shock leaves banks
too leveraged, and with a burden of costs due to their deviation from capital requirements.
It is then optimal for banks to try to re-balance assets and liabilities by reducing loans and
increasing deposits: they do so by increasing all retail rates, which weakens demand for
loans and stimulates that for deposits. The reduction in loans is of major concern for banks
since they need to approach rapidly the capital/loans target: therefore, loan rates undergo
a higher increase than the deposit rate. Loan volumes decrease both for entrepreneurs
and for impatient households, reducing resources available to them. Entrepreneurs cut
investment substantially and move to a larger capital utilization, given that its relative
cost has decreased and that physical capital is less useful as collateral; at the same time
they increase labor demand. Labor is more productive and becomes more costly: wages
are set higher if demand by ¯rms has to be met. The initial increase in labor income
sustains consumption of households, in particular of impatient agents, and limits the fall
in output, at least on impact: later on, in the beginning of the third year, the contraction
in output is three times the one on impact, at almost 0.3 percent. Monetary policy
is quite una®ected by the exogenous change in bank capital positions: the policy rate
increases only slightly in response to some upward movements in prices which re°ect
31the increase in labor and capacity costs only.25 Banks balance their books and capital
positions independently of any monetary stimulus. A rapid increase in the intermediation
margin contributes to this re-balancing by building back bank capital stock.
Increasing the cost of deviating from the target capital-to-assets ratio does not change
the dynamics substantially. Obviously, all responses to the capital loss shock are harshened.
The most signi¯cant variation relates to the fact that, with a higher deviation cost, banks'
optimal adjustment strategy assigns a greater importance to deleveraging, with respect
to a plain squaring of the balance sheet: in fact, while in the benchmark case the cap-
ital loss was also countered via an increase in deposits, with a higher cost of deviating
from the target Kb=B ratio banks aim mainly at decreasing loans and increasing capital
(through higher loan rates and intermediation margins) and accordingly stop raising rates
on deposits (whose volumes actually fall). In this case, these dynamics are key to a much
faster recovery of the banking capital position and of leverage, which is almost complete
after just one and a half year.
7 Concluding remarks
The paper has presented a model in which entrepreneurs and impatient households con-
tract loans subject to borrowing constraints. Loans are supplied by imperfectly compet-
itive banks using both deposits collected from savers and bank capital that they have
accumulated out of reinvested earnings. Margins charged on loans depend on the interest
rate elasticities of loan and deposit demands, on the degree of interest rate stickiness and
on the banks' capital-to-assets ratio. Banks' balance-sheet constraints establish a link
between the business cycle, which a®ects bank pro¯ts and thus capital, and the supply
and the cost of loans.
The model has been estimated using Bayesian techniques and data for the euro area
over the period 1998:Q1-2009:Q1, in order to analyze three important issues. First, we
study how ¯nancial intermediation modi¯es the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy and technology shocks. Overall, after a monetary shock, the presence of ¯nancial
intermediation induces an attenuation e®ect on real variables, mainly re°ecting the pres-
ence of sticky bank rates. In the case of a technology shock, imperfect competition in
banking generates some attenuation as well, specially of consumption, but it also deter-
mines additional persistence in the response of real activity. The quantitative impact of
the presence of a bank capital requirement on responses to a monetary policy shock turns
out to be negligible; however, the link between loan margins and the capital-to-assets
ratio signi¯cantly dampens the response of investment following a technology innovation.
Secondly, we analyze the transmission of ¯nancial shocks to the real economy and
their contribution to business cycle °uctuations. In particular, we show that shocks in
25 A mild increase in in°ation together with a fall in output is also found by Meh and Moran (2008)
in an analogous experiment of bank capital loss.
32the banking sector explain the largest fraction of the fall of output in the euro area in
2008, while macroeconomic shocks played a smaller role.
Finally we simulate a \credit crunch" scenario via an unexpected and exogenous de-
struction of banking capital and ¯nd that the e®ects of this shock can be sizeable, partic-
ularly on investment.
Together with results in papers like Christiano et al. (2008), our ¯ndings suggest the
need to include explicitly ¯nancial and credit shocks when building general equilibrium
models to analyze business cycle °uctuations: neglecting them, not only on the demand
but also on the supply side of credit, could lead one to miss important drivers of the cycle.
33References
[1] Adolfson, M., S. Lase¶ en, J. Lind¶ e and M. Villani (2007), \Bayesian Estimation of an
Open Economy DSGE Model with Incomplete Pass-Through", Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, Vol. 72, pp. 481-511.
[2] Aliaga-D¶ ³az, R. and M.P. Olivero (2007), \Macroeconomic Implications of Market
Power in Banking", mimeo.
[3] Andr¶ es, J. and O. Arce (2009), \Banking competition, housing prices and macroeco-
nomic stability", Banco de Espa~ na Working Paper No. 0830.
[4] Aslam, A. and E. Santoro (2008), \Bank Lending, Housing and Spreads", University
of Copenhagen, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 08-27.
[5] Benati, L. (2008), \Investigating in°ation persistence across monetary regimes",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 123(3), pp. 1005-1060.
[6] Benes, J. and K. Lees (2007), \Monopolistic Banks and Fixed Rate Contracts: Im-
plications for Open Economy In°ation Targeting", mimeo.
[7] Berger, A.N., A. DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt, R. Levine and J.G. Haubrich (2004), \Bank Con-
centration and Competition: An Evolution in the Making", Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, Vol. 36(3).
[8] Berger, A.N. and T.H. Hannan (1991), \The Rigidity of Prices: Evidence from the
Banking Industry", American Economic Review, Vol. 81(4), pp. 938-45.
[9] Berger, A.N. and G. Udell (1992), \Some Evidence on the Empirical Signi¯cance of
Credit Rationing", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100(5), pp. 1047-77.
[10] Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999), \The Financial Accelerator in a
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework", in J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.),
Handbook of Macroeconomics, North-Holland, pp. 1341-1393.
[11] Bikker, J.A. and K. Haaf (2002), \Competition, Concentration and their Relation-
ship: An Empirical Analysis of the Banking Industry", Journal of Banking and
Finance, Vol. 26, pp. 2191- 2214.
[12] Brooks, S.P. and A. Gelman (1998), \General Methods for Monitoring Convergence
of Iterative Simulations", Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics, Vol.
7(4), pp. 434-455.
[13] Calem, P.S., M.B. Gordy and L.J. Mester (2006), \Switching Costs and Adverse
Selection in the Market for Credit Cards: New Evidence", Journal of Banking &
Finance, Vol. 30, pp. 1653-1685.
34[14] Calza, A., T. Monacelli and L. Stracca (2009), \Housing Finance and Monetary
Policy", ECB Working Paper No. 1069.
[15] Christensen, I., P. Corrigan, C. Mendicino and S. Nishiyama (2007), \An Estimated
Open-Economy General Equilibrium Model with Housing Investment and Financial
Frictions", mimeo.
[16] Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans (2005), \Nominal Rigidities and the
Dynamic E®ects of a Shock to Monetary Policy", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
113(1), pp. 1-46.
[17] Christiano, L., R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2008), \Financial Factors in Business
Cycles", mimeo.
[18] Claessens, S., and L. Laeven (2004), \What Drives Bank Competition? Some Inter-
national Evidence", Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 36, pp. 563-583.
[19] Claeys, S. and R. Vander Vennet (2008), \Determinants of Bank Interest Margins
in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparison with the West", Economic Systems,
Vol. 32(2), pp. 197-216.
[20] Corvoisier S. and R. Gropp (2002), \Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates",
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 26, pp. 2155-2189.
[21] C¶ urdia, V. and M. Woodford (2008), \Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Pol-
icy", mimeo.
[22] De Bandt, O., and E.P. Davis (2000), \Competition, Contestability and Market
Structure in European Banking Sectors on the Eve of EMU", Journal of Banking
and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 1045-1066.
[23] De Bondt, G. (2005), \Interest Rate Pass-Through: Empirical Results for the Euro
Area", German Economic Review, Vol. 6(1), pp. 37-78.
[24] Degryse, H. and S. Ongena (2008), \Competition and Regulation in the Banking
Sector: A Review of the Empirical Evidence on the Sources of Bank Rents", in
Boot, A. and A. Thakor (eds.), Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking,
Elsevier.
[25] Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven, and R. Levine (2004), \Regulations, Market Struc-
ture, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation", Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 36, pp. 563-583.
[26] de Walque, G., O. Pierrard and A. Rouabah (2008) \Financial (In)stability, Supervi-
sion and Liquidity Injections : a Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach", National
Bank of Belgium Research No. 10-23.
35[27] Diamond, D. (1984), \Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring", Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 51(3), pp. 393-414.
[28] Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983), \Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity",
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91(3), pp. 401-419.
[29] Dick, A. (2002), \Demand Estimation and Consumer Welfare in the Banking Indus-
try", Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics
Discussion Series Paper No. 2002-58.
[30] ECB (2009a), Monthly Bulletin, July.
[31] ECB (2009b), \Recent developments in the retail bank interest rate pass-through in
the euro area", Monthly Bulletin, August.
[32] Freixas, X. and J.C. Rochet, (1997), Microeconomics of Banking, MIT Press.
[33] Goodfriend, M. and B.T. McCallum (2007), \Banking and Interest Rates in Monetary
Policy Analysis: a Quantitative Exploration", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.
54(5), pp. 1480-1507.
[34] Greenbaum, S., G. Kanatas and I. Venezia (1989), \Equilibrium Loan Pricing under
the Bank-Client Relationship", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 13.
[35] Gropp R., C. Kok S¿rensen and J. Lichtenberger (2007), \The Dynamics of Bank
Spreads and Financial Structure", ECB Working Paper No. 714.
[36] Iacoviello, M. (2005), \House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary Policy in
the Business Cycle", American Economic Review, Vol. 95(3), pp. 739-764.
[37] Iacoviello, M. and S. Neri (2009), \Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an
Estimated DSGE Model", AEJ Macro, forthcoming.
[38] Kim, M., D. Kliger and B. Vale (2003), \Estimating Switching Costs: The Case of
Banking", Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 12, pp. 25-56.
[39] Klein, M. (1971), \A Theory of the Banking Firm", Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, Vol. 3, pp. 205-218.
[40] Kok S¿rensen, C. and T. Werner (2006), \Bank Interest Rate Pass-Through in the
Euro Area: a Cross Country Comparison", ECB Working Paper No. 580.
[41] Levine, R. (2003), \Denying Foreign Bank Entry: Implications for Bank Interest
Margins", Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 222.
[42] Mandelman, F.S. (2006), \Business Cycles: A Role for Imperfect Competition in the
Banking System", Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2006-21.
36[43] Markovic, B. (2006), \Bank Capital Channels in the Monetary Transmission Mech-
anism", Bank of England Working Paper No. 313.
[44] Meh, C. and K. Moran (2008), \The Role of Bank Capital in the Propagation of
Shocks", Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2008-36.
[45] Miles, D., (2004), \The UK Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer-Term View. Final
Report and Recommendations", HMSO Report.
[46] Monti, M. (1972), \Deposit, Credit, and Interest Rate Determination under Alterna-
tive Bank Objectives" in Mathematical Methods in Investment and Finance, Szego,
G.P. and K. Shell (eds.), North-Holland.
[47] Nakajima, J. and Y. Teranishi (2009), \The Evolution of Loan Rate Stickiness across
the Euro Area", IMES Discussion Paper No. 2009-E-10.
[48] Panzar, J.C. and J.N. Rosse (1987), \Testing for Monopoly Equilibrium", Journal of
Industrial Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 443-456.
[49] Schmitt-Groh¶ e, S. and M. Uribe (2006), \Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a
Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Model", in Gertler, M. and K. Rogo® (eds.), NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2005, MIT Press, pp. 383-425.
[50] Sharpe, S.A. (1990), \Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Con-
tracts: a Stylized Model of Customer Relationships", Journal of Finance, Vol. 45,
pp. 1069-1087.
[51] Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2003), \An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium Model of the Euro Area", Journal of the European Economic Association,
Vol. 1(5), pp. 1123-1175.
[52] Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007), \Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A
Bayesian DSGE Approach", American Economic Review, Vol. 97(3), pp. 586-606.
[53] van den Heuvel, S.J. (2008), \The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements",
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55(2), pp. 298-320.
[54] Von Thadden, E.L. (2004), \Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit
Contracts: the Winner's Curse", Finance Research Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 11-23.
37Appendix
A The rest of the model
A.1 Loan and deposit demand
The demand function for household i seeking an amount of real loans equal to ¹ bI
t(i) can




























t > 1. Aggregating FOCs across all impatient households, aggregate impatient
















t(i) indicates aggregate demand for household loans and the aggregate























Demand for deposits at bank j of impatient household i, seeking an overall amount of





































where dt ´ °PdP









38A.2 The labor market
We assume that workers provide slightly di®erentiated labor types, sold by unions to
perfectly competitive labor packers who assemble them in a CES aggregator with pa-
rameter "l
t (modeled as an exogenous process) and sell the homogeneous labor input to
entrepreneurs. For each labor type m there are two unions, one for patient households
and one for impatient households (indexed by s). Each union (s;m) sets nominal wages
fW s
t (m)g1
t=0 for the work e®orts of its members by maximizing their utility subject to a
downward sloping demand and to quadratic adjustment costs (premultiplied by a coe±-
cient ·w), with indexation ¶w to a weighted average of lagged and steady-state in°ation.
The union equally charges each member household lump-sum fees to cover adjustment





















































In a symmetric equilibrium, the labor choice for a household of type s will be given by


































A.3 Capital goods producers
In the capital goods producing (CGP) sector, at the beginning of period t zero-pro¯t
perfectly competitive ¯rms buy at price P k
t last period undepreciated capital ((1¡±)kt¡1)
from entrepreneurs (who also own CGP ¯rms); at the same time, they buy at price Pt an
amount it of ¯nal goods from retailers. With these inputs in hand, the activity of CGP
¯rms increases the stock of e®ective capital ¹ xt, which is then sold back to entrepreneurs
at the end of the period, still at price P k
t . Old capital can be converted one-to-one into
new capital, while the transformation of the ¯nal good is subject to quadratic adjustment












t ¢¹ xt ¡ it
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39where ¢¹ xt = kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt¡1 is the °ow output, ·i is the parameter measuring the cost
for adjusting investment and "
qk
t is a shock to the productivity of investment goods.
From FOCs (see technical appendix), the real price of capital qk
t is determined by
a dynamic equation similar to that in Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003).26
A.4 Goods retailers
The retail goods market is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Retailers are
just \branders": they buy the intermediate good from entrepreneurs at the wholesale
price P W
t and di®erentiate it at no cost. Each retailer then sells his unique variety,
applying a markup over the wholesale price, taking into account the demand that he
faces characterized by a stochastic price-elasticity "
y
t. Retailers' prices are sticky and
are indexed to a combination of past and steady-state in°ation, with relative weights
parameterized by ¶p; if retailers want to change their price beyond what indexation allows,
they face a quadratic adjustment cost parameterized by ·p. They must choose fPt(j)g1
t=0


































A central bank is able to set exactly the interest rate prevailing in the interbank market
rt. In setting the policy rate, the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule of the type
(1 + rt) = (1 + r)











where Á¼ and Áy are the weights assigned to in°ation and output stabilization, respectively,
r is the steady-state nominal interest rate, yt = °EyE
t (i) is aggregate output and "r
t is an
i.i.d. shock to monetary policy with normal distribution and standard deviation ¾r.
A.6 Aggregation and market clearing
In the ¯nal goods market, the equilibrium condition is given by the following resource
constraint
yt = ct + q
k
t [kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt¡1] + kt¡1Ã (ut) + ±
bk
b
t¡1 + Adjt (15)
26 As pointed out by BGG (1999), a totally equivalent expression for the price of capital can be obtained
by internalizing the capital formation problem within the entrepreneurs' problem.
40where ct = cP
t +cI
t + cE
t is aggregate consumption, kt = °EkE
t (i) is the aggregate stock of
physical capital and kb
t is aggregate bank capital (°s; s 2 P;I;E, is the measure of each
subset of agents). The term Adjt includes real adjustment costs for prices, wages and
interest rates.
In the housing market, equilibrium is given by
¹ h = °
Ph
P




where ¹ h denotes the exogenous ¯xed housing supply stock.
41B Data and sources
Real consumption: Final consumption of households and NPISH's, constant prices,
seasonally adjusted, not working day adjusted, euro area 15 (¯xed composition). Source:
Eurostat.
Real investment: Gross ¯xed capital formation, constant prices, seasonally adjusted,
not working day adjusted, euro area 15 (¯xed composition). Source: Eurostat.
Real house prices: Nominal residential property prices de°ated with the harmonized
index of consumer prices. Sources: ECB and Eurostat.
Wages: Hourly labor cost index - wages and salaries, whole economy excluding agri-
culture, ¯shing and government sectors, seasonally and working day adjusted. Source:
Eurostat.
In°ation: Quarter on quarter log di®erences in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP), overall index, seasonally adjusted, not working day adjusted, euro area 15 (¯xed
composition). Source: ECB.
Nominal interest rate (policy): Eonia rate. Source: ECB.
Nominal interest rate on loans to households: Annualized agreed rate (AAR) on
loans for house purchases, total maturity, new business coverage, euro area (changing
composition). Source: ECB.
Nominal interest rate on loans to ¯rms: AAR on loans other than bank overdrafts
to non-¯nancial corporations with maturity of over one year, total amount, new business
coverage, euro area (changing composition). Source: ECB.
Nominal interest rate on deposits: Weighted average (with weights proportional to
outstanding amounts) of AARs on overnight deposits (total maturity), on deposits with
agreed maturity of up to two years, and on deposits redeemable at notice of up to three
months, households and non-pro¯t institutions serving households, new business coverage,
euro area (changing composition). Source: ECB.
Loans to households: Outstanding amounts of loans to households for house purchas-
ing, total maturity, euro area (changing composition), neither seasonally nor working day
adjusted. Source: ECB.
Loans to ¯rms: Outstanding amounts of loans to non-¯nancial corporations, total ma-
turity, euro area (changing composition), neither seasonally nor working day adjusted.
Source: ECB.
42Deposits: Outstanding amounts of overnight deposits (total maturity), deposits with
agreed maturity of up to two years and deposits redeemable at notice of up to three
months, households and non-pro¯t institutions serving households, euro area (changing
composition). Source: ECB.
For bank retail interest rates, we join two ECB data sets. From 2003:Q1, we use
harmonized monthly data from the MFI Interest Rate statistics { or MIR statistics {,
in new business coverage as it re°ects better than the outstanding amounts the extent
to which the policy rate impulse is transmitted to retail bank rates. Data from MIR
are extended back to 1998:Q1 resorting to the euro area Retail Interest Rate (RIR) data
set, compiled by the ECB until 2003:Q9. Since original national data in RIR are neither
harmonized in coverage nor in nature (nominal or e®ective), we check the stability of
the relation between comparable MIR-RIR rates series over the nine-month overlapping
period of 2003 before using monthly variations in comparable series from RIR to backcast
MIR rates.
Volumes of loans and deposits are taken in outstanding amounts: in fact, if taken in
new business coverage (available from 2003:Q1 in MIR) the high volatility of these series
would, ¯rst, not allow a safe backcasting of volumes data and, second, induce undue
instability when used as weights for aggregating the various existing interest rate series
into our level of breakdown.
43Table 1. Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
¯P Patient households' discount factor 0.9943
¯I Impatient households' discount factor 0.975
¯E Entrepreneurs' discount factor 0.975
Á Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1.0
¹ Share of unconstrained households 0.8
"h Weight of housing in households' utility function 0.2
® Capital share in the production function 0.25
± Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.025
"y "y
"y¡1 is the markup in the goods market 6
"l "l
"l¡1 is the markup in the labour market 5
mI Households' LTV ratio 0.7
mE Entrepreneurs' LTV ratio 0.35
ºb Target capital-to-loans ratio 0.09
"d "d
"d¡1 markdown on deposit rate -1.46
"bH "bH
"bH¡1 markup on rate on loans to households 2.79
"bE "bE
"bE¡1 markup on rate on loans to ¯rms 3.12
±b Cost for managing the bank's capital position 0.1049
44Table 2A. Prior and posterior distribution of the structural parameters
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter distr. Mean Std.dev. Mean 2.5 percent Median 97.5 percent
·p Gamma 50.0 20.0 30.57 10.68 28.65 49.89
·w Gamma 50.0 20.0 102.35 70.29 99.90 133.81
·i Gamma 2.5 1.0 10.26 7.57 10.18 12.81
·d Gamma 10.0 2.5 3.62 2.28 3.50 4.96
·bE Gamma 3.0 2.5 9.51 6.60 9.36 12.31
·bH Gamma 6.0 2.5 10.22 7.47 10.09 12.88
·Kb Gamma 10.0 5.0 11.49 4.03 11.07 18.27
Á¼ Gamma 2.0 0.5 2.01 1.72 1.98 2.30
ÁR Beta 0.75 0.10 0.77 0.72 0.77 0.81
Áy Normal 0.10 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.55
¶p Beta 0.50 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.28
¶w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.39
ah Beta 0.50 0.10 0.85 0.81 0.86 0.90
Note: Results based on 10 chains, each with 100,000 draws based on the Metropolis algorithm.
45Table 2B. Prior and posterior distribution of the structural parameters
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter distr. Mean Std.dev. Mean 2.5 percent Median 97.5 percent
½z Beta 0.8 0.10 0.396 0.260 0.393 0.531
½a Beta 0.8 0.10 0.936 0.899 0.939 0.974
½j Beta 0.8 0.10 0.916 0.858 0.921 0.975
½mE Beta 0.8 0.10 0.892 0.839 0.894 0.945
½mI Beta 0.8 0.10 0.925 0.875 0.929 0.979
½d Beta 0.8 0.10 0.830 0.739 0.838 0.917
½bH Beta 0.8 0.10 0.808 0.675 0.819 0.949
½bE Beta 0.8 0.10 0.820 0.688 0.834 0.960
½qk Beta 0.8 0.10 0.543 0.395 0.548 0.694
½y Beta 0.8 0.10 0.306 0.205 0.305 0.411
½l Beta 0.8 0.10 0.636 0.510 0.640 0.769
½Kb Beta 0.8 0.10 0.810 0.718 0.813 0.906
¾z Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.035
¾a Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007
¾j Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.076 0.022 0.070 0.129
¾mE Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.009
¾mI Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
¾d Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.033 0.024 0.032 0.043
¾bH Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.067 0.035 0.066 0.115
¾bE Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.063 0.034 0.063 0.096
¾qk Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.025
¾R Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
¾y Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.634 0.274 0.598 0.985
¾l Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.577 0.378 0.561 0.760
¾Kb Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.031 0.026 0.031 0.037
Note: Results based on 10 chains, each with 100,000 draws based on the Metropolis algorithm.
46Figure 1. Bank Lending Survey of the euro area (net percentages)
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(1) Net percentage of banks reporting the factor as contributing to tightening of lending standards.  
(2) Net percentage of banks reporting an overall tightening in lending standards.  
(3) Net percentage of banks reporting to have increased margin.  
 



























































Note: The marginal posterior densities are based on 10 chains, each with 100,000 draws based on the
Metropolis algorithm. Blue solid lines denote the posterior distribution, red dashed lines the prior dis-
tribution.
48Figure 3. Prior and posterior marginal distributions


































Note: The marginal posterior densities are based on 10 chains, each with 100,000 draws based on the
Metropolis algorithm. Blue solid lines denote the posterior distribution, red dashed lines the prior dis-
tribution.
49Figure 4. The role of banks and ¯nancial frictions in the transmission of a contractionary
monetary policy shock
























































































Note: The impulse responses are computed using the median of the posterior distribution of the bench-
mark model (BK). All rates are shown as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percentage
points. All others graphs report percentage deviations from steady state. The red circled line is from the
benchmark model (BK). The green squared line is from the quasi-NK model (QNK). The light blue line
with triangles is from the model with ¯nancial frictions but without banks (FF). The dark blue crossed
line is from the model with banks, but with °exible rates and without bank capital (FR). The black line
is from the model without bank capital but with sticky rates (SR).
50Figure 5. The role of banks and ¯nancial frictions in the transmission of a positive
technology shock











































































Note: The impulse responses are computed using the median of the posterior distribution of the bench-
mark model (BK). All rates are shown as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percentage
points. All others graphs report percentage deviations from steady state. The red circled line is from the
benchmark model (BK). The green squared line is from the quasi-NK model (QNK). The light blue line
with triangles is from the model with ¯nancial frictions but without banks (FF). The dark blue crossed
line is from the model with banks, but with °exible rates and without bank capital (FR). The black line
is from the model without bank capital but with sticky rates (SR).
51Figure 6. Historical decomposition of the main macro variables: 2004:Q1 - 2009:Q1






GDP (perc. dev. from ss)





Investment (perc. dev. from ss)




Annualized Inflation (p.p.; dev. from ss)
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macro MP financial total
Note: The decomposition is computed using the median of the posterior distribution of the benchmark
model. Macro shocks include shocks to: price and wage markups, technology, consumption preferences,
housing demand, and investment-speci¯c technology. MP refers to monetary policy shocks. Financial
shocks include shocks to the loan-to-value ratios on loans to ¯rms and households, shocks to the markup
on bank interest rates and balance sheet shocks.
52Figure 7. Historical decomposition of the main ¯nancial variables: 2004:Q1 - 2009:Q1
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Loans to households (perc. dev. from ss)
 
 
macro MP firms fin. hholds fin. other fin. total
Note: The decomposition is computed using the median of the posterior distribution of the benchmark
model. Macro shocks include shocks to: price and wage markups, technology, consumption preferences,
housing demand, and investment-speci¯c technology. MP refers to monetary policy shocks. The ¯rms
¯nancial category includes shocks to LTV ratios for loans to ¯rms and shocks to the interest rate markup
on their loans. The households ¯nancial category includes shocks to LTV ratios for loans to households
and shocks to the interest rate markup on their loans. Finally, other ¯nancial shocks include shocks to
the interest rate markdown on deposits and shocks to banks' balance sheets.




















































































































Note: The impulse responses are computed using the median of the posterior distribution of the bench-
mark model (black solid line), and replacing ·Kb = 100 (blue circled line), respectively. All rates are
shown as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percentage points. The capital-to-assets
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